| Decides each tool call inline | Every agent tool call is allowed or denied before it reaches the protected system. | Yes Vekri Gateway decides every MCP tool call sent through it before the broker executes it; a denied call never reaches the system. It is a boundary only when it is the only path to that system. | Documented Each MCP request is authenticated and authorized on its own before the gateway routes it to a server instance. Access is granted per MCP server or registered tool. [1] |
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| Verified workload identity | An agent running as a workload proves who it is with a credential the platform issued, not a shared key. | Yes Kubernetes projected service-account tokens, verified with TokenReview before Vekri issues a short-lived token for the run; every call is then authenticated. SPIFFE X.509-SVIDs from a configured trust bundle (no Workload API yet). | Partly App roles can be assigned to service principals, which call the gateway with Entra ID tokens. Kubernetes service-account tokens or SPIFFE for calling agents are not described. [2] |
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| Employee agents use company SSO | Agents that employees run sign in as that employee, through the company identity provider. | Yes Vekri is the MCP authorization server for Claude Code and federates to your OpenID Connect provider. SAML sign-in is not available yet. | Documented Cloud deployments require Entra ID bearer tokens, and clients such as VS Code handle the sign-in. Local development mode allows anonymous access. [1] |
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| Task-scoped permissions from the server | What an agent may do is set per task by the server, not by the agent or its prompt. | Yes A run scope for workloads, or a protected access assignment for employees. The effective permission is always an intersection, never a widening. | Not in public docs Access follows app roles set on each server or tool. A scope issued by the server for each task is not described in the public documentation. [1] |
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| Policy as code, deny by default | Decisions come from versioned policy, and anything not allowed is refused. | Yes Cedar over typed operations. Unknown operations and evaluation errors are denied, and a revision can be simulated before it is published. | Partly Read access to a server or tool goes to its creator, to holders of the app roles it lists, and to the mcp.admin role. The README's production guidance says to add finer-grained access control with RBAC or custom ACLs. [1] [2] |
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| Approval of the exact operation | A person approves one specific operation, and the approval cannot be reused for another. | Yes Privileged writes wait for another person to approve that operation, bound to its digest, short-lived and single use, with separation of duties. | Not in public docs Approval of an individual tool call by a person is not described in the public documentation. |
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| Agent never holds backend credentials | Secrets for the protected system stay out of the agent's reach. | Yes A broker executes with narrowly scoped Kubernetes or GitHub App credentials. Incoming tokens are never forwarded. | Partly Servers and tools the gateway deploys can use the cluster's Azure workload identity to reach Azure resources; by default only administrators can enable it. Whether a caller's token is forwarded to MCP servers is not described. [2] |
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| Audit evidence of decision and outcome | Each call leaves a durable record of what was decided and what happened. | Yes Intent is recorded durably before execution and the outcome after; an uncertain outcome is never retried blindly. | Not in public docs The Azure deployment provisions Application Insights, and each server's logs can be read through the API. An audit record of each tool call's decision and outcome is not described in the public documentation. [1] |
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| AI agents on workstations | Finds AI coding agents and other AI applications on employee devices, and watches or controls what they do there. | Partly Vekri Endpoint discovers coding agents, desktop and IDE AI apps, local models and their MCP servers on macOS and Linux, and its local MCP gateway decides each MCP tool call sent through it (Claude Code verified connecting; tool calls verified with an MCP client library). On macOS, a network gateway mediates MCP requests to approved remote servers, and agent control stops AI agents the organization has not allowed. Hooks observe built-in tools without blocking them; Windows is not supported. | Not in public docs Discovering coding agents on employee devices is not described in the public documentation. |
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| Prompt and output inspection | Detects prompt injection or sensitive data in what models read and write. | Partly Tool results on Vekri Gateway and the local MCP gateway are inspected for prompt injection before the agent reads them; sensitive-data categories are detected on the device, off by default. Browsers and file uploads are not inspected. | Not in public docs Inspection of prompts, tool arguments or results is not described in the public documentation. |
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| Systems covered | Which systems, platforms or agents the product works with. | Kubernetes and GitHub, with GitLab, PostgreSQL, MySQL, MongoDB, Slack, Jira, Linear, Asana, ClickUp, monday.com, HubSpot, Pipedrive, Zendesk, Freshdesk and custom OpenAPI connectors in preview. | MCP servers and tools packaged as container images, which the gateway deploys and scales in the cluster. It can also proxy existing local and remote MCP servers. |
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| Deployment | How the product is delivered. | In Vekri's cloud, or self-hosted in your Kubernetes cluster with no connection to Vekri. | Open source (MIT) and self-hosted on Kubernetes: locally with Docker Desktop's Kubernetes, or on Azure Kubernetes Service through a deployment template that provisions the supporting Azure resources. |
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